Blameworthy Belief

Blameworthy Belief
Author :
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages : 284
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9781402059612
ISBN-13 : 1402059612
Rating : 4/5 (12 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Blameworthy Belief by : Nikolaj Nottelmann

Download or read book Blameworthy Belief written by Nikolaj Nottelmann and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-07-18 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.

Ways to be Blameworthy

Ways to be Blameworthy
Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Total Pages : 192
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9780192570215
ISBN-13 : 0192570218
Rating : 4/5 (15 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Ways to be Blameworthy by : Elinor Mason

Download or read book Ways to be Blameworthy written by Elinor Mason and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2019-02-21 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There must be some connection between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. Yet traditional approaches to each set of concepts tend to take the other set for granted. This book takes an integrated approach to these questions, drawing on both ethics and responsibility theory, and thereby illuminating both sets of concepts. Elinor Mason describes this as 'normative responsibility theory': the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting. She presents a pluralistic view of both obligation and blameworthiness, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective wrongness, to acting wrongly by one's own lights. Subjective obligation, and ordinary blame, apply only to those who are within our moral community, who understand and share our value system. By contrast, detached blame can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. In detached blame, the blame rather than the blameworthiness is fundamental. Finally, agents can take responsibility for some inadvertent wrongs, and thus become responsible. This third sort of blameworthiness, 'extended blameworthiness', applies when the agent understands the objective wrongness of her act, but has no bad will. In such cases, the social context may be such that the agent should take responsibility, and accept ordinary blame from the wronged party.

Responsible Belief

Responsible Belief
Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Total Pages : 289
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9780190608118
ISBN-13 : 0190608110
Rating : 4/5 (18 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Responsible Belief by : Rik Peels

Download or read book Responsible Belief written by Rik Peels and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017 with total page 289 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book develops and defends a theory of responsible belief. The author argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence them. It is because we have intellectual obligations to influence our beliefs that we are responsible for them.

Epistemic Blame

Epistemic Blame
Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Total Pages : 230
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9780192890610
ISBN-13 : 0192890611
Rating : 4/5 (10 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Epistemic Blame by : Cameron Boult

Download or read book Epistemic Blame written by Cameron Boult and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2024-07-12 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Epistemic Blame is the first book-length philosophical examination of our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings. People clearly evaluate and critique one another for forming unjustified beliefs, harbouring biases, and pursuing faulty methods of inquiry. But what is the nature of this criticism? Does it ever amount to a kind of blame? And should we blame one another for epistemic failings? Through careful analysis of the concept of blame, and the nature of epistemic normativity, this book argues that there are competing sources of pressure inherent in the increasingly prominent notion of "epistemic blame". The more genuinely blame-like a response is, the less fitting in the epistemic domain it seems; but the more fitting in the epistemic domain a response is, the less genuinely blame-like it seems. These competing sources of pressure comprise a puzzle about epistemic blame. The most promising resolution of this puzzle lies in the interpersonal side of epistemic normativity. Drawing on work by T. M. Scanlon, R. J. Wallace, and others, Cameron Boult argues that members of epistemic communities stand in "epistemic relationships", and epistemic blame just is a way of modifying these relationships. By thinking of epistemic blame as a distinctive kind of relationship modification, we locate a response that is both robustly blame-like, and distinctly epistemic. The result is a ground-breaking new theory of epistemic blame, the relationship-based account. With a solution to the puzzle of epistemic blame in hand, a new project for social epistemology comes into view: the ethics of epistemic blame. Boult demonstrates the power of the relationship-based account to contribute to this project, develops a systematic analysis of standing to epistemically blame, and defends the value of epistemic blame in our social and political lives. He shows that epistemic relationships can also be used to illuminate foundational questions about epistemic normativity, responsibility for our beliefs and assertions, and a wide range of epistemic harms, such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Throughout the investigation, a more structured and precise understanding of the parallels and points of interaction between the epistemic and practical domains emerges.

Blame

Blame
Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press on Demand
Total Pages : 331
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9780199860821
ISBN-13 : 0199860823
Rating : 4/5 (21 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Blame by : D. Justin Coates

Download or read book Blame written by D. Justin Coates and published by Oxford University Press on Demand. This book was released on 2013-01-31 with total page 331 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is it to blame someone, and when are would-be blamers in a position to do so? What function does blame serve in our lives, and is it a valuable way of relating to one another? The essays in this volume explore answers to these and related questions.

In Praise of Blame

In Praise of Blame
Author :
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Total Pages : 158
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9780195187427
ISBN-13 : 0195187423
Rating : 4/5 (27 Downloads)

Book Synopsis In Praise of Blame by : George Sher

Download or read book In Praise of Blame written by George Sher and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Blame is an unpopular & neglected notion that goes against the grain of a therapeutically-orientated culture & has received relatively little philosophical attention. George Sher discusses questions about the nature, normative status & the relation to character of blame, arguing that it is inseparable from morality itself.

Knowledge, Belief, and Character

Knowledge, Belief, and Character
Author :
Publisher : Rowman & Littlefield
Total Pages : 256
Release :
ISBN-10 : 0847696537
ISBN-13 : 9780847696536
Rating : 4/5 (37 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Knowledge, Belief, and Character by : Guy Axtell

Download or read book Knowledge, Belief, and Character written by Guy Axtell and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2000 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There have been many books over the past decade, including outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a strong and growing interest in the intellectual virtues and in the development of virtue-theoretic approaches in epistemology. There have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with Ernest Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and extending to Linda Zabzebski's Virtue of the Mind (Cambridge, 1996). Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet's Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together the best contributions of the influential authors working in this growing area of epistemological research, and to create a collection of essays as a useful course text and research source. Several of the articles included in the volume are previously unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach of virtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier," and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute